The challenge of peace making

At a joint press conference with President Hamid Karzai on January 11, President Obama announced that Nato’s security handover would be accelerated and control of all operations transferred to Afghan forces this spring – ahead of schedule and well before the drawdown of most foreign forces from Afghanistan in 2014.

The announcement attracted much of the media’s attention during Karzai’s Washington visit. As did a set of undecided issues about the speed of the US pullout, scope of its post-2014 military presence and legal immunity for the remaining forces.

More consequential for Afghanistan’s future than these military issues are questions of political strategy. Acceleration of diplomatic efforts aimed at a political settlement is of greater, long-term importance than quickening the pace of the military drawdown. Progress on the political track will more significantly shape the strategic environment in which the 2014 transition will take place.


From this perspective, it was noteworthy that during the news conference both leaders’ reiterated support for talks with the Taliban and for the first time President Obama publicly endorsed the establishment of a Taliban office to facilitate these talks. Such an office has existed unofficially for some time, but has yet to formally open or be officially recognised.

The statement about the Taliban office suggested two things. One that Karzai had been prevailed upon to concede ground, given his objections to a political process outside Afghanistan. These misgivings were reiterated more stridently following last month’s unprecedented meeting in France between different Afghan groups including Taliban representatives.

More importantly the announcement signalled US keenness to revive direct contacts with the Taliban that began well over a year ago and came to constitute a nascent ‘Qatar process’, which aimed to install formal negotiations. In March 2012, talks were suspended when Taliban representatives accused US interlocutors of reneging on commitments, the most important being the transfer of five Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo to Doha.



These statements followed a flurry of diplomatic activity between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Kabul proposed a ‘Peace Process Road Map to 2015’, while Pakistan released several mid-level Taliban members from its custody. The road map however simply laid out what had to be accomplished in a five-phase process, not how to accomplish those goals or the accommodation this would require. It did not indicate what would be offered to the Taliban to encourage them to join the process.

On the eve of Karzai’s US trip, American officials stated their intention “to accelerate the peace process”, for which they said Pakistan had an ‘important role’ to play. White House officials also said they saw “a political settlement as absolutely essential to bring the war to a responsible close”.

If, in its present form, the ‘Road Map’ fell short of an executable plan, it was also uncertain how the Taliban detainees’ release would advance reconciliation (other than build goodwill between Islamabad and Kabul) in the absence of a credible peace process for them to join. Their release evoked concern from US officials who asked for prior consultations before Islamabad freed any more Taliban members. Islamabad was also urged to ‘monitor’ the released prisoners – a task Pakistani officials felt exceeded their capacity.


Despite these preliminary exchanges, the fundamental reality is that there is still no agreed framework or coherent process that can lay the basis for serious peace negotiations. The American envoy to Kabul James Cunningham acknowledged as much when he said last week that the Afghan reconciliation process “hasn’t even begun.” The Chantilly meeting indicates that while opposing Afghan groups seem willing to assemble at conferences this does not translate into an intention to negotiate, much less to settle.

Nevertheless, intense bilateral and trilateral discussions are underway about how to reach out to the Taliban – between Kabul, Islamabad and Washington. Discussion has sometimes involved ‘mapping’ efforts to identify who’s who in the Taliban and what channels to pursue. Pakistan has shown willingness to support different tracks proposed by various stakeholders but stressed that these should be mutually reinforcing.

To make real progress, these various tracks would have to eventually converge and peace-making efforts channelled into a single, consistent process acceptable to key players and potential negotiators. Otherwise diplomatic energies will dissipate in scattered efforts.

Once formalised, a Taliban office in Doha could assume a key role in helping to inaugurate a substantial peace process. But the path ahead is strewn with difficulties. Several obstacles have to be overcome before the Qatar process can get underway.

For a start the Obama administration will have to move with much greater urgency than it has shown so far. It is also unclear what the present status is of several confidence-building measures regarded earlier by American and Taliban interlocutors as necessary to launch the political office. Differences have continued on what this should be called and assigned to do, especially as Karzai fears this would shift focus from Kabul to Doha as the venue for peace talks and eventually sideline him.

The set of CBMs that were under negotiation before US-Taliban talks broke down involved moving five Taliban detainees from Guantanamo in exchange for Bowe Bergdahl, the American prisoner held by the Taliban-aligned Haqqani network. The CBMs also entailed Taliban statements denouncing international terrorism and assenting to enter talks with ‘other Afghans’ – a way of sidestepping the Taliban’s opposition to talking to Kabul. The modalities and sequencing of these steps is still to be determined and will likely be the subject of intense, behind-the-scenes negotiations.

US diplomatic efforts towards this end are expected to intensify in the coming months. The key question is what the US will be prepared to offer the Taliban to entice them to resume talks when Taliban leaders know that in under two years most American troops will depart Afghanistan.

For its part Pakistan has committed to help the Qatar peace effort. Last week’s meeting between Foreign Secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani, American and Afghan officials in Abu Dhabi was part of consultations that included moving this process forward. The upcoming visit by senior US officials to Islamabad this week will likely have a similar purpose.

Pakistan has long called for careful sequencing of steps to establish the conditions for a serious peace process. It has also emphasised the need for Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US to evolve an agreed political strategy that includes a mutual reduction of violence and an eventual ceasefire to prepare the ground for a ‘negotiated peace’. It remains uncertain at what stage and under what conditions the Americans will be prepared to call a halt to fighting. The Afghan ‘road map’ itself envisages a ceasefire in the second half of 2013.

Meanwhile the Taliban restated their negotiating position at the conference in France with familiar core demands: withdrawal of all foreign forces, end to occupation, changes in the constitution in accordance with Islamic principles, release of imprisoned Taliban leaders and delisting from the UN sanctions list. But they also declared that they were not interested in monopolising power, would work with others and respect women’s rights. Only when serious negotiations begin can the Taliban be tested on how much flexibility they have on key issues.

The looming deadline of 2014 imparts urgency to getting peace talks going. All stakeholders should have a common interest to ensure a stable outcome for Afghanistan’s security and political transitions and cooperate to avert worst-case scenarios. No one would want 2014 to become another 1989, least of all Pakistan.